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The Waterloo Strikes of 1919 
LESLIE STEGH 
IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR I, workers in many 
industries in the United States went on strike, stimulated by in-
flation, the end of federal controls over labor relations, and the 
readjustment to a postwar economic order. At the same time, a 
renewed vigor in the ranks of organized labor was countered 
by a determination among industrial leaders to secure complete 
control over the workplace. Conflicts over wages, work condi-
tions, the eight-hour day, and collective bargaining divided la-
bor and management. The most famous strike of 1919 was by 
steelworkers nationwide.1  Readers of Waterloo’s newspapers in 
1919 also encountered striking rail workers around the country, 
the strike at the International Harvester plant in Chicago, gun-
fire and bombs during a strike in South Bartonville, Illinois, and 
strikes among meatpackers in Chicago, coal miners in Illinois, 
actors in New York City, and streetcar workers in Des Moines, 
Louisville, and Pittsburgh. The results of these mostly failed 
strikes helped shape a pattern of industrial relations that lasted 
until the economic dislocation of the 1930s. The strikes in Wa-
terloo in 1919 illustrate the labor unrest of the era and the goals 
of management.2
 
1. See David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919 (Philadelphia, 1965). 
2. For an overview of the era, see David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of 
Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925 (Cam-
bridge, 1987). For a survey of Iowa’s labor history in the twentieth century, see 
Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Iowa Labor in the 
Twentieth Century (Iowa City, 1993). For statistics about union membership 
and strikes nationally, see Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times 
to 1970, part 1 (Washington, DC, 1975). 
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 The Waterloo strikes were led by the recently organized 
International Association of Machinists (IAM) Local No. 314. 
Opposing the new union was an increasingly well-organized 
group of employers led by the Waterloo Gasoline Engine Com-
pany, recently purchased by Deere & Company, the Moline, 
Illinois, manufacturer of farm equipment. The strikes were 
characterized by picketing, speeches, parades, a lack of serious 
violence, and efforts on both sides to use local newspapers to 
sway public opinion. Labor leaders in Iowa made Waterloo 
the center of their fight for collective bargaining and union rec-
ognition. Collective bargaining was the main issue, but there 
was also a furor over the related question of “open shops” and 
“closed shops.”3 The machinists attempted to rally other labor 
unions to their cause to produce a general strike, but they even-
tually failed. Deere & Company organized employers to oppose 
collective bargaining and apply pressure to those who seemed 
willing to submit to labor’s demands. 
 
IN 1914 Waterloo, Iowa, had an estimated population of 35,000. 
Its major employers were the William Galloway Company, Iowa 
Dairy Separator Company, and the Waterloo Gasoline Engine 
Company (WGE). Those three employed most of the factory 
workers in the city. Waterloo had become a center for the manu-
facture of dairy and agricultural equipment; at one time, one-
fifth of the gasoline engines manufactured in the country were 
built there. WGE was the largest employer of factory workers 
and after 1918 was owned by Deere & Company.4
 Labor organizations had existed in Waterloo since 1902, when 
electrical workers organized, and most trades were unionized by 
1915, with about 5,000 union members in the city. The Central 
Labor Union, formed in 1903, comprised 32 labor bodies. The 
Central was affiliated with the Iowa State Federation of Labor 
and the American Federation of Labor. T. N. Stufflebeam was its 
                                                 
3. “Open shops” are those where labor unions are not recognized by employers 
as bargaining groups and union members are not employed. “Closed shops” 
are those where labor unions are bargaining agents and only union members 
are employed. 
4. John C. Hartman, ed., History of Black Hawk County and Its People, 2 vols. 
(Chicago, 1915), 1: 240, 262, 263, 399.  
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Waterloo Gasoline Engine Company, undated. Courtesy of John Deere. 
president; its secretary-treasurer, Leon Link, was a member of the 
executive board of the state federation.5  At the beginning of 1919, 
machinists were the largest group of non-unionized workers. 
 Businessmen first created a formal organization in Waterloo 
in 1884 that evolved into the Board of Trade and Commercial 
Club. In 1907 another businessmen’s association, the Waterloo 
Club, was founded. Both were formed to promote and foster 
civic and industrial growth. The Waterloo Manufacturers’ Asso-
cation, established in 1919, was made up of companies opposed 
to the strikers. It evolved in response to strike developments, ex-
panding its membership and hiring a full-time secretary. By No-
vember it became the Waterloo Industrial Association. Its goal 
was to protect the open shop and oppose collective bargaining.6
                                                 
5. Hartman, ed., History of Black Hawk County, 1:263; “We Demand Justice,” 
flyer, 3/9/1920, document #11854, Deere & Company Archives, Moline, IL 
(hereafter cited as DA followed by the document number); Waterloo Courier 
(hereafter cited simply as Courier), 8/4/1919, 8/25/1919, 11/12/1919, 
1/24/1993; John Marie Daly, “History of Unionization in Waterloo, Iowa” 
(M.A. thesis, Creighton University, 1962), 5, 6, 11, 12, 13.  
6. Hartman, ed., History of Black Hawk County, 1:257, 258; Reports to Deere & 
Company, 7/31/1919, 8/19/1919, 8/20/1919, 11/15/1919, 11/20/1919, DA 
#11836; L. Clausen to J. Johnson, 9/19/1919, DA #11855. Initially, the WMA 
was made up of Armstrong Manufacturing Co., Blackhawk Manufacturing 
Co., Bovee Grinder & Furnace Works, Dart Truck and Tractor Corp., Headford 
Bros. & Hitchins, Iowa Dairy Separator Co., Model Laundry, Novelty Wire 
Works, Sibert’s White Laundry, Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., Waterloo Ce-
ment Machinery Corp., Waterloo Laundry Co., and Wm. Galloway Co. Others 
joined in late August: Chamberlain Machinery Works, Litchfield Manufacturing, 
Powers Manufacturing Co., Repass Automobile Co., and Swift Foundry Co.  
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 Some employers in Iowa and elsewhere had launched an 
open shop drive in 1902 to preserve union-free workplaces.7 Al-
though Waterloo employers did not join that movement, after 
World War I they did join the uncoordinated but almost simul-
taneous nationwide drive for the open shop. One of the first 
struggles that centered on the issue resulted in a celebrated, but 
failed, general strike in Seattle. The open shop became a major 
issue in the steel strike of 1919, and local strikes prompted the 
establishment of open shop associations around the country in 
1919. By 1920, the demands of local employers led the National 
Association of Manufacturers to formally adopt the open shop 
as one of its policies. By that fall, the “American Plan of Em-
ployment” had been endorsed by almost 500 open shop associa-
tions in 240 cities across 44 states.8
 
AS 1919 BEGAN, the IAM’s recent successes had instilled a 
sense of optimism. It had enjoyed a steady growth in member-
ship since 1911, with a huge jump in 1918, when membership 
more than doubled. The National War Labor Board had ap-
proved the right of employees to bargain collectively. The IAM 
was in good shape financially, largely because there had been 
few strikes to drain its resources. Its leadership foresaw poten-
tial problems, however, from hostile employers who would not 
provoke a strike against a healthy union but who were ready to 
act at the first sign of weakness.9
                                                 
7. See Ralph Scharnau, “The Labor Movement in Iowa, 1900–1910,” Journal of 
the West 35 (1996), 19–28; William C. Pratt, “The Omaha Business Men’s Asso-
ciation and the Open Shop, 1903–1909,” Nebraska History 70 (1989), 172–83; 
William Millikan, A Union Against Unions: The Minneapolis Citizens Alliance and 
Its Fight Against Organized Labor, 1903–1947 (St. Paul, 2001). 
8. See Allen M. Wakstein, “The Origins of the Open-Shop Movement, 1919–
1920,” Journal of American History 51 (1964), 460–47; Rob Rosenthal, “Nothing 
Moved but the Tide: The Seattle General Strike of 1919,” Labor’s Heritage 4 (Fall 
1992), 34-53; Colin J. Davis, Power at Odds: The 1922 National Railroad Shopmen’s 
Strike (Urbana and Chicago, 1997); and Millikan, Union Against Unions, 176. 
9. The IAM had reason to be positive but also had many unmet goals for 1919. 
One was to continue filling its coffers: leaders wanted to increase the union’s 
reserve fund from $1 million to $5 million. The IAM anticipated problems for 
1919 caused by the end of war-related production and the lack of any federal 
program to deal with economic readjustment. The influx of returning military 
Waterloo Strikes of 1919      325 
 In 1919 management began its assault by reducing wages, 
increasing hours, and changing working conditions. The result 
was many strikes by local unions and other labor organizations. 
It was an era of “industrial warfare,” according to the IAM. In 
August the International requested that there be no more strikes. 
By October the union reported that there were more strikes, and 
strikes threatened, than during any other period in the country’s 
history. In November more than 30,000 workers were on strike. 
The impact on the IAM treasury was devastating. By November 
the strike fund was empty. As a result, the union encountered 
“considerable dissension, and some dissatisfaction, within our 
fold.”10 All of this was crucial for the situation in Waterloo. 
 From management’s point of view, labor conditions in Wa-
terloo were quiet and workers seemed happy until the end of 
June 1919, when A. G. Abbey, a national organizer for the IAM, 
arrived in Waterloo after successfully organizing a machinists’ 
strike at Clinton, Iowa. He began holding meetings in the streets 
and making noon-hour and evening speeches outside the facto-
ries. This, according to management, stirred a spirit of unrest 
among workers. Abbey displayed skill as a speaker, although 
some noted his tendency to exaggerate. A private detective 
noted that he was “smoothe tongued,” a “strong personality,” 
and a “very good hypnotist” (he was also an amateur magician 
who put on shows at the Waterloo Labor Temple). By July 31, 
about 2,000 of Waterloo’s 3,000 machinists were in the union, 
Local No. 314 of the IAM.11
                                                                                                       
personnel to the work force was another problem. Machinists Monthly Journal, 
January 1919, 61–62; ibid., June 1919, 507–10. 
10. Machinists Monthly Journal, January 1919, 35; ibid., June 1919, 512; ibid., 
August 1919, 728; ibid., October 1919, 946; ibid., November 1919, 998; ibid., 
December 1919, 1135, 1136. 
11. The manufacturers maintained that Abbey was the cause of the strikes. 
WGE officials began to monitor his activities early on, preparing written re-
ports almost on a daily basis. See Reports to Deere & Company by L. A. Para-
dise, 7/8/1919–12/25/1919, DA #11836; J. E. Johnson to Walter Brown, 8/8/ 
1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen, “The Right of Individual Contract,” a speech 
to the annual convention of the National Founders Association, 11/19/1919, 
DA #11870; P. J. Doyle to L. R. Clausen, 8/16/1919, DA #11855; Courier, 7/31/ 
1919, 8/8/1919; Waterloo Times-Tribune (hereafter cited simply as Tribune), 
8/6/1919; Machinists Monthly Journal, April 1919.  
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Waterloo Boy N tractors and loading crew, 1920. Courtesy of John Deere. 
 Efforts to organize machine shop workers in Waterloo peaked 
in July. The workers demanded an eight-hour day, higher wages 
(usually the equivalent of 10 hours pay for 8 hours of work), 
time-and-a-half for overtime, changes in working conditions, 
recognition of the unions, and the right to bargain collectively. 
Management thought that the labor “agitators” were operating 
according to a typical, prearranged plan: organize a limited 
number of workers and “stampede the rest into a strike” with 
the objective of making Waterloo a “100% union community.”12
 
WATERLOO’S FIRST STRIKE began on July 29 with action 
against Iowa Dairy Separator Company, one of the largest em-
ployers of machinists in Waterloo and considered by Local 314 to 
be a leader in the effort to crush the unions.13 A strike followed at 
William Galloway Company the next day. The labor organizers 
planned to submit their demands to other shops, “continuing 
thru the smaller shops employing union machinists.”14
                                                 
12. L. R. Clausen to E. H. Gary, 9/3/1919, DA #11855; Courier, 7/31/1919; 
Report to Deere & Company, 7/17/1919, DA #11836.  
13. See “We Demand Justice,” DA #11854.  
14. Courier, 7/31/1919. 
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 Negotiations on July 31 at WGE, overseen by Deere & Com-
pany’s Leon Clausen, also failed.15  The company released a 
statement to the Waterloo Courier that clearly rejected collective 
bargaining and emphasized the “constitutional” rights of work-
ers and management to negotiate individual contracts.16
 Management at the struck businesses, grouped as the Wa-
terloo Manufacturers’ Association (WMA), met daily, formed a 
united front, and presented their position to the public. They 
maintained that they were defending an important constitu-
tional right, that of the individual contract. John E. Johnson, 
spokesman for both WGE and for the WMA, was, according to 
the Oelwein Labor Journal, “the monkey on the stick of the John 
Deere Corporation.”17
                                                 
15. For the WGE employees’ demands, see DA #11863. The demands included 
an eight-hour day, a six-day work week, time-and-a-half for overtime, double 
time for Sundays and holidays, the right to join a union and bargain collec-
tively, the elimination of piece work, equal pay for women, and the establish-
ment of an arbitration procedure. Clausen stayed behind the scenes during the 
strike. He had joined Deere & Company in 1912, rose rapidly, and eventually 
(in March 1919) became vice president of manufacturing and a company direc-
tor. In 1924 he left Deere & Company to become president of J. I. Case Company. 
Clausen was totally opposed to unions of any type. The individual contract, as 
far as he was concerned, was the backbone of labor-management relations. He 
was convinced that unions were the sole cause of strikes during the war and 
that the absence of strikes at Deere factories was a result of good management 
of labor relations. Labor agitators caused the strikes at Waterloo and around 
the nation in 1919, he believed. Clausen recognized employers’ responsibility 
to treat workers fairly. Workplace justice needed to be provided to individuals 
in order for the individual employment contract to work as an industrial rela-
tions device. It was management’s responsibility to see to it that workers’ earn-
ings went up each year, he believed; each man should “get ahead.” Cedar Rapids 
Tribune, 1/16/1920; Factory Managers Meeting, 10/11–13/1920, DA #37741; 
Case Eagle, October 1965; L. R. Clausen to E. H. Gary, 9/3/1919, DA #11855; 
L. R. Clausen to A. H. Head, 11/25/1919, DA #11855; Clausen, “The Right of 
Individual Contract.” 
16. Courier, 7/31/1919, 9/16/1919; Report to Deere & Company, 7/31/1919, 
DA #11836. 
17. Oelwein Labor Journal, 10/15/1919. The Labor Journal was started in 1919 
and was published twice a month; its editor, Frank Sheeley, was an employee 
of WGE and chaired the machinists’ strike committee. John Johnson moved to 
Waterloo in 1900 to become pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church 
but resigned after three years for health reasons and joined WGE as a book-
keeper. He rose rapidly and became secretary and treasurer. He also acquired 
a financial interest in the company in 1907. He eventually came to own 29 per-
cent of the shares of common stock of WGE. (George B. Miller and Louis Witry 
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 The manufacturers used the courts to their advantage. On 
July 31 Iowa Dairy sought and received an injunction from the 
district court against Local 314 of the IAM, its officers, and spe-
cific members. Provisions of the injunction specified that defen-
dants were restrained from “molesting, injuring or damaging 
plaintiff’s property; from assembling about the plant or factory 
in large numbers while interviewing or trying to peaceably in-
duce any of the employes to leave their jobs; from compelling or 
attempting to compel by abusive language, threats, intimidation, 
force, coercion or violence any of the employes to leave the em-
ploy of the company.” The request for the injunction included 
accounts of violence and threats to keep employees from enter-
ing the plant. On August 1 WGE received from the district court 
a temporary writ of injunction against the IAM (local and na-
tional) to prohibit members from entering company property, 
assembling in large numbers around the plant, or intimidating 
employees into breaking the written employment contract with 
the company. Attorneys for the IAM immediately began attempts 
to have the injunctions lifted.18
 From the beginning, officials at WGE pointed to lawlessness 
at their plant and at the Iowa Dairy plant.19  Representatives of 
the WMA met with the police chief on August 1. Giving nu-
merous examples of lawbreaking, they maintained that the city 
was in a state of anarchy. The chief was unsure whether he had 
enough deputies to handle the situation but agreed to try to en-
force the law. Later that day the chief visited the WGE plant 
and told the strikers that if they violated any laws he would be 
forced to turn enforcement over to the county sheriff. The chief’s 
actions did not satisfy company officials because he did nothing 
to secure the free passage of workers in and out of the plant.20
                                                                                                       
owned the remaining stock. In March 1918 they sold all of their stock to Deere 
& Company for $2 million.) Johnson became general manager when Deere & 
Company purchased the business in March 1918. Petition, 6/7/1926, John E. 
Johnson v. the United States of America, In the Court of Claims, DA #11832; Cou-
rier, 8/18/1919, 9/16/1919.  
18. Courier, 8/1/1919, 8/4/1919; Tribune, 8/6/1919; Waterloo Gasoline Engine 
Co. Statement of Legal Proceedings, DA #11837. 
19. Report to Deere & Company, 7/31/1919, DA #11863.  
20. Reports to Deere & Company, 8/1/1919, 8/2/1919, 8/3/1919, DA #11836; 
Courier, 8/1/1919. 
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 On Monday, August 4, WGE rejected demands from the 
International Brotherhood of Foundry Employes Union No. 113 
and the International Molders’ Union No. 459 and distributed a 
printed explanation to foundry employees.21  The company, un-
willing to abandon its long-held policies, would not end the em-
ployee’s right to individual contracts. It promised good wages 
(on an individual basis) and urged any employee with a griev-
ance to take it up with management. The statement concluded, 
“Every man is entitled to and will receive a square deal.”22  The 
molders did not walk out, indicating that they would seek per-
mission from their international before striking. Management’s 
response was to close the foundry, citing a surplus of castings. 
Three hundred more workers were put out of work.23
 After the mayor suggested that John Johnson, WGE’s chief 
executive, meet with other businessmen and a committee of 
employees to try to reach a settlement, Johnson met with the 
mayor himself on August 4. At their meeting, Johnson rejected 
the mayor’s proposal, insisting that outside arbitration was not 
appropriate. Johnson also spoke with Sheriff David B. Hender-
son, who indicated that he could do nothing to enforce the laws 
until the city refused to do so. The city’s chief of police, on the 
other hand, said it was the sheriff’s responsibility to enforce the 
injunctions.24
 On August 5 WGE filed a suit in district court against 16 
defendants, including the IAM, its national organizer (Abbey), 
Local No. 314, and its officers. The suit asked for a judgment of 
$25,000 against each “as damages for the alleged failure to carry 
out written contracts of agreement between the company as 
employer and the men as employees.” The company claimed 
that it would suffer serious financial losses because it would be 
                                                 
21. The unions wanted an eight-hour day, a flat increase in pay to $6 per day, 
the acceptance of collective bargaining, the right of union membership, and 
the establishment of a process to arbitrate any disagreements between man-
agement and the unions’ shop committees. Unions, like the molders, had ex-
isted within WGE, but there was no collective bargaining or closed shop. 
22. Notices to Employees, 7/31/1919 and 8/4/1919, DA #11857; Agreements 
with Labor Unions, 1919, DA #11866. 
23. Courier, 7/31/1919, 8/4/1919; Tribune, 8/7/1919. 
24. Reports to Deere & Company, 8/2/1919, 8/4/1919, DA #11836. 
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Interior of the Waterloo Gasoline Engine plant. Courtesy of John Deere. 
unable to fulfill contracts for tractors and engines and that the 
defendants “conspired and confederated” and were “unlaw-
fully” trying to prevent employees who were under contract 
from entering the plant. The company claimed that it had the 
constitutional right to an unobstructed flow of labor into the 
factory and to contract with workers individually without in-
terference from third parties. Labor leaders reportedly were 
unaware of what the suit meant. Abbey responded, when in-
terviewed, that he “was much obliged for the compliment but 
didn’t have the $25,000.”25
 
THE PRESS became increasingly important as both sides tried 
to influence public opinion. WGE printed a sample employee con-
tract in the Courier and the Tribune. On August 7 the striking ma-
chinists issued a statement of their own in the Courier. It said that 
WGE used a piece-work system, but employees could be com-
                                                 
25. Petition at Law, Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co. v. International Association of 
Machinists, et al, 8/4/1919, DA #11841; Courier, 8/5/1919; Tribune, 8/6/1919. 
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pelled to do “day work” for periods of several weeks at a time; 
when a piece-work employee exceeded the limit set for his ma-
chine, the job would be retimed upwards even though employee 
contracts specified that piece rates were not to be changed during 
the life of a contract. The union statement claimed that manage-
ment was unwilling to arbitrate or offer a counterproposal.26
 On the same day, the employers issued their own statement 
in the Courier. It said: (1) if the strike lasted for two more weeks 
the government would take over the plants and operate them; 
(2) granting the “closed shop” would “sound the death knell” 
of the plants in six months because none of their competitors 
in other areas operated with “closed shops”; (3) the continued 
prosperity of Waterloo depended on the cooperation of the ma-
jor plants; (4) because of an ongoing slump in demand for agri-
cultural equipment, only half of the workers would be recalled 
even if the strike ended immediately; and (5) there would be a 
“long siege” if labor continued to demand a closed shop.27 The 
statement, which especially emphasized the issue of closed 
shops, was full of exaggerations and was an obvious attempt to 
influence public opinion. 
 After August 7 the employers assumed a lower public pro-
file. In a letter to WMA, Deere & Company vice president Leon 
Clausen wrote, “It is my opinion that the manufacturers of Wa-
terloo are in a very favorable position because they can and will 
win the strike if they sit tight and hold together.” He added that 
manufacturers should be careful not to give union officials “a 
real cause for action” or anything “the union crowd” could use 
to gain public sympathy. “The matter of publicity is one that is 
important. Mr. Abbey should not be given anything which will 
enable him to break into print just at the present time.” One of 
the keys to success, Clausen insisted, was to “hold all the man-
ufacturers together, without a break.”28
 From the outset, Deere & Company provided direction to 
the WMA. Clausen believed that the other employers were in-
                                                 
26. Report to Deere & Company, 8/6/1919, DA #11836; Courier, 8/7/1919; 
Tribune, 8/6/1919. 
27. Courier, 8/7/1919. 
28. L. R. Clausen to WMA, 8/7/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen to J. E. John-
son, 8/8/1919, DA #11855. 
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experienced in handling such matters and needed assistance. 
They wanted to stand together but were not sure what to do. 
Deere & Company could help, Clausen said, and the situation 
at Waterloo could be “cleaned up and put on a real basis of sta-
bility,” resulting in “the greatest benefit to the individual and 
the community.”29
 
THE SUCCESSION OF STRIKES at manufacturing concerns 
came as no surprise, but few observers expected strikes at the 
city’s laundries.30  The primary issue was collective bargaining, 
which management, pressured by the WMA, would not accept. 
In response, Waterloo Steam Laundry workers struck on Au-
gust 9; employees at Model Laundry followed on August 11. 
On August 16 painters at F. M. Michael Paint Company went 
on strike for higher pay, adding another group to the ranks of the 
strikers.31 Abbey’s task was to unite them against an increasingly 
well-organized body of employers. 
 As one of their tactics, the manufacturers tried to discredit 
the labor leaders. They hired a private detective agency to in-
vestigate Abbey but were probably disappointed to uncover 
nothing scandalous about him. Management also received se-
cret reports from union members regarding labor activities, al-
though Local 314 publicly denied that such spies existed. Local 
attorneys representing WGE sought information for use in ex-
pected litigation. Abbey was of particular interest to them. 32
 On August 13 labor organized a large parade with a reported 
3,000 participants. The following day labor leaders, including 
the president of the State Federation of Labor, a member of the 
                                                 
29. L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/15/1919, DA #11855. 
30. In addition to the strikes at WGE, Iowa Dairy Separator Co., and William 
Galloway Co., the employees at the Waterloo Cement Machinery Corp. went 
on strike on August 2; workers at Novelty Wire Works followed two days later. 
Courier, 8/4/1919. 
31. Courier, 8/11/1919, 8/12/1919, 8/17/1919; Tribune, 8/12/1919, 8/17/1919; 
Report to Deere & Company, 8/7/1919, DA #11836. 
32. Carleton Sias to J. E. Johnson, 8/4/1919, DA #11855; P. J. Doyle to L. R. 
Clausen, 8/16/1919, DA #11855. See also Reports on Meetings Held by A. G. 
Abbey, September 1919, DA #11844; Report on the Strike Situation, 8/24/1919, 
DA #11842; Flyers, Strike file, DA #11854.  
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carpenters’ state council, Abbey, and many others who did not 
want to be identified, met for several hours at the Labor Temple. 
These leaders reportedly agreed to make Waterloo the focal 
point for the battle for union recognition and collective bargain-
ing in Iowa. The federation feared that employers in Waterloo 
were determined to crush the strike and break up the unions. If 
they were to succeed, all organized labor in the state would suf-
fer. If, on the other hand, the Waterloo strikers were successful 
in securing higher wages, a shorter work day, and the right to 
bargain collectively, other employers in the state, the federation 
maintained, would be less inclined to try to break up unions. As 
a result, all workers in Iowa were encouraged to raise money for 
the Waterloo strike fund.33
 The employers were also busy. By mid-August the WMA 
had finished a reorganization to include a broader cross-section 
of employers, hired a person full time to run day-to-day busi-
ness, and prepared a public relations attack. The main point 
they wanted to emphasize was the importance of the individual 
employment contract; they did not want employees who did 
not see its merit. In addition, the manufacturers considered it 
important for the general public to understand and believe in 
individual contracts. The manufacturers planned a series of ads 
that, according to Clausen, would “leave no doubt in the mind 
of the average citizen, as to the viciousness of Union Policies, 
and to the correctness of our own policies.”34
 At the same time, Deere & Company wanted its fellow em-
ployers to understand that employers had important responsi-
bilities to their workers: ensuring that all employees received a 
proper income, helping them understand that the employers 
were interested in their “individual welfare and success in life,” 
making promotions available, providing kindly assistance to 
newly hired people, and assuring workers that the company 
would remove any individual injustices from the workplace. 
                                                 
33. “Assist Your Brothers,” 9/4/1919, DA #11854 [the date handwritten on this 
document after the fact is October 4, 1919, but it appears that the correct date is 
more likely to be September 4]; Tribune, 8/14/1919, 8/15/1919; Courier, 8/15/ 
1919. 
34. L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/15/1919, DA #11855; Reports to Deere & 
Company, 8/19/1919, 8/20/1919, DA #11836. 
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To make this work, it was pointed out, shop-floor foremen and 
managers had to understand and support these responsibilities.35
 That was the approach the WMA wanted to discuss at its 
meeting on Saturday afternoon, August 16, the most violent day 
of the strike. That morning strikers had recognized some WGE 
foremen and superintendents on a streetcar. The strikers sur-
rounded the car, boarded it, and attempted to throw off the 
employees. A “general melee” followed, with some “personal 
encounters.” In the afternoon, strikers removed four Galloway 
employees from a streetcar and tossed one into Blackhawk 
Creek. In the evening, another Galloway employee on his way 
home from work was stopped and beaten. The county attorney 
filed reports, and the sheriff made five arrests for assault and 
one for disturbing the “public quiet.” Abbey insisted that “we 
do not countenance forcible methods in gaining our ends,” but 
he admitted that “it is certain that among 2500 men now out of 
work because of employers’ unwillingness to arbitrate that there 
will be a few hot heads who fail to think before they act.”36
 The manufacturers decided that the time had come for ac-
tion to protect workers. They and their attorneys met on Sun-
day, August 17, and decided to tell the county supervisors that 
the county would be held liable if they did not protect lives and 
property. John Johnson met with some of the supervisors at his 
home the following morning, and they agreed to call a special 
meeting of the board of supervisors for that afternoon.37
 About one hundred people attended the supervisors’ meet-
ing on August 18. The six or so who spoke “dwelt upon alleged 
law violations committed by strikers.” In what must have been 
an inflammatory speech, Johnson said the local strikes were 
part of “a nationwide plan for labor to control all industry” and 
a local effort to unionize all of Waterloo. He denounced Abbey 
for having associates in Minneapolis who were “red socialists” 
and for secretly supporting labor violence while publicly re-
nouncing it. Johnson claimed that there was increasing violence 
                                                 
35. J. E. Johnson to WMA, 8/14/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 
8/15/1919, DA #11855. 
36. Courier, 8/17/1919; Tribune, 8/17/1919. 
37. Reports to Deere & Company, 8/16/1919, 8/17/1919, 8/18/1919, DA #11836. 
Waterloo Strikes of 1919      335 
in Waterloo. “If the county board does not grant protection,” 
he warned, “I fear there will be loss of life.” Many workers went 
on strike, he claimed, because they had been intimidated; the 
plants would be able to open soon if ample protection was pro-
vided for them. The board unanimously agreed to Johnson’s 
request to authorize the sheriff to appoint 1,000 or more depu-
ties to maintain order and protect life and property. Right after 
the meeting, Sheriff Henderson notified sheriffs around the 
state that deputies would be hired.38
 The next day, the Central Labor Union responded to the 
board’s action with a statement printed in full in the Courier. 
It pointed out that there were two sides to the controversy: the 
strikers’ and management’s. The statement was issued to inform 
the third party involved: the public. It said that no agreement 
presented to manufacturers called for a “closed shop,” but the 
manufacturers wanted the public to think so. Manufacturers 
were trying to gain public sympathy, the statement continued, 
but they knew that the appointment of the deputies might stir 
up trouble.39
 The Tribune, reporting that the supervisors’ action was un-
expected, made an important observation: responsibility for the 
strike situation had been taken from the city and placed in the 
hands of the county.40  The manufacturers wanted law enforce-
ment officials to help crush the strike, and the only way to 
achieve that (barring really serious violence) was to convince 
the more sympathetic county officials, including the sheriff, to 
become the main keepers of the peace. WGE “brought pres-
sure” on the sheriff to “keep him in line.” On August 9 man-
agement had met with him and “put the matter up squarely to 
the Sheriff that he must handle the situation . . . ; that it was his 
duty to preserve order and if he didn’t do his duty, we would 
see that he did.”41  As far as the unions were concerned, the 
sheriff was a tool of the companies. Company officials, in turn, 
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were convinced that the Waterloo police were sympathetic to 
the strikers.42
 Violent incidents took place on August 19, perhaps precipi-
tated by the supervisors’ action the day before. About 8:00 a.m. 
some Iowa Dairy Separator Company employees were driving 
to work when they were attacked. One of the assailants jumped 
on the car’s running board, struck the driver, and grabbed the 
steering wheel. The driver lost control of the car, which hit a team 
of horses pulling a wagon. Two or three pickets from WGE also 
allegedly beat an office employee of Hawkeye Oil Company.43   
 In response, the companies placed a large ad in the Courier 
and Tribune on August 21 that read: “To the Public: In response 
to repeated inquiries, we will resume operations as soon as our 
public streets become safe for our workmen who desire to return 
to work. Under present arrangements this should soon be ac-
complished.”44 The employers ran yet another large ad in the 
Tribune on August 23, an obvious attempt to split the strikers. 
The ad gave the employers’ version of the origins of the strike:  
Local organizers, in accordance with a cold-blooded plan, re-
quested an outside agency to send agitators to their assistance. 
They came. Business was stopped. Thousands of men were thrown 
out of their jobs. The rights of peaceful men were trampled upon. 
Force and violence were employed. Want and distress which al-
ways follows idleness made their appearance among our citizens. 
. . . If the responsibility for putting thousands of men out of work 
had been placed solely on your shoulders, would YOU have given 
the word to walk out? . . . Are the men responsible for this condi-
tion REALLY interested in YOUR welfare? . . . Is it FAIR to you 
and YOUR families?45
 On that same day management received a report from a 
paid investigator who painted a gloomy picture: the strikers 
were going to win because they had the support of the mayor, 
the police chief, and a growing number of citizens and small 
businessmen; they were successfully organizing all types of 
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workers; and they were promised money from the Iowa State 
Federation of Labor. The state federation’s pledge of $10,000 
per week for the strike fund was followed by pledges from local 
labor organizations around the state.46
 The actual number of strikers was not officially reported, 
but on August 23 the unions estimated that about 2,755 workers 
were on strike. In addition, about 350 foundry workers were out 
of work even though they were not on strike, bringing the total 
to more than 3,100 people unemployed after August 2 because 
of the strikes.47
 
DESPITE the large number of strikers and the seemingly un-
favorable news, WGE leaders met to prepare for the workers’ 
return to work. They also agreed that no union members would 
be reemployed. In the future all grievances would be handled 
without delay “to make it possible for an employee to get better 
representation thru his foreman than he could possibly get thru 
a walking delegate or any other third party.” They agreed that 
all workers were entitled to an adequate wage, and piece rates 
were discussed. They established an elaborate interview proc-
ess for returning employees to ensure that only those who real-
ized that strikers had broken their contracts would be rehired; 
they had to promise not only not to do it again but to stand 
with the company to prevent a recurrence. If returning employ-
ees were able to pass this rigorous test, they would be given a 
new employment contract to sign, have pensions and benefits 
reinstated, and receive a physical. They would also be required 
to sign a form asking why they went on strike and who encour-
aged them to do so.48
 On August 24 and 25 the employers placed another ad in the 
Tribune and Courier offering to reinstate former employees with-
out prejudice “if you talk the matter over with us personally.” 
Management at WGE believed that workers at all of the plants 
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were ready to return and would do so when they were no longer 
afraid of harm from the strikers. 
 A “fine spirit” pervaded the WMA’s regular meeting on Au-
gust 25. Sheriff Henderson was commended for his good work. 
He speculated that there would be no more violence, an opinion 
that was confirmed by reports from the manufacturers’ “special 
men.”49
 The manufacturers’ public relations barrage continued on 
August 26, as they placed an ad in the Courier encouraging 
strikers to cut out a form that was included and return it to their 
former employers. The form asked whether the striker had per-
sonally voted to strike, whether promises made by strike lead-
ers had been kept, whether, and how much, strike benefits had 
been received, and whether the striker expected to continue to 
receive benefits. The ad probably was less an attempt to gather 
data than it was an effort to get employees to think about their 
personal situations. The employers placed a second big ad in 
the Tribune and Courier (signed by an expanded list of employ-
ers) asking why many of Waterloo’s industries were idle. It ex-
plained, “For over three weeks the earnest, industrious workers 
of Waterloo have been held out of employment and have been 
prevented from earning their pay by the actions of local and 
outside agitators. The great majority of these workers who have 
been forced out of employment are not in sympathy with the 
radical and unsound demands of the self-elected agitators. . . . 
Violence, threats, and force have temporarily taken the place of 
the rights of individuals. Waterloo faces a grave crisis.”50
 On August 27 events seemed to point toward an end to the 
dissension. The strikers at Bovee Grinder and Furnace Works 
returned to work under previous conditions, but with an increase 
in wages. It was the first strike settled since they began on July 
29, and the return reportedly had union approval. But Bovee’s 
agreement to a wage increase brought open criticism from the 
WMA, which was doing its best to avoid concessions.51
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 By August 30, WGE was convinced that the strikers’ morale 
was weakening and that many were ready to return to work.52  
At that juncture some secret negotiations took place. J. E. Jordan 
and Harry M. Reed, attorneys for the strikers, met with J. W. 
Arbuckle, attorney for Litchfield Manufacturing Company. Be-
cause Litchfield had not been struck, Jordan and Reed thought 
that Arbuckle would be a good intermediary to use to approach 
the other manufacturers. Arbuckle then met with John Johnson, 
who responded for the employers: each employee would have 
to return individually under the previous terms of employment 
and sign a new contract; under no circumstances would there 
be any negotiations with a representative of the strikers. John-
son further told Arbuckle that if he or the strikers’ attorneys 
wanted to help they should get Abbey to leave town. Johnson 
said workers had been content and well compensated before 
Abbey arrived and began agitating; the door was, and always 
had been, open to all individuals to negotiate; and the employ-
ers felt no ill will towards the vast majority of the strikers.53
 In the meetings with Arbuckle, Johnson insisted that the em-
ployers were united in their stand against collective bargaining. 
Arbuckle said that Jordan had indicated to him that the strikers 
were ready to return to work; some would even be willing to 
abandon their union membership. Johnson responded that all 
returning workers would be required to sign individual con-
tracts containing a clause that they would not join a labor union 
during the life of the contract; future discussions would be fruit-
less if the workers did not agree.54  The manufacturers were 
sensing victory and were standing united as August ended. 
 On September 5 the Sibert, Waterloo, and Model laundries 
all reopened with little turmoil. The WMA tried to force the 
laundry owners to make no concessions to the workers. Most 
former employees were on the job; the laundries hired replace-
ments for the workers who remained on strike, which created 
some tension. More picketers appeared, so deputies were de-
ployed around the laundries in case of trouble. Nothing hap-
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WGE employees, undated. Courtesy of John Deere. 
pened, though. Teamsters from one coal company refused to de-
liver a load to the laundries, but those from another agreed to 
do so. The laundry owners had been willing to make some wage 
concessions, but they would not accept collective bargaining. 
In fact, once they were struck, they demanded that employees 
give up their union memberships as a condition of employment. 
Members of the WMA encouraged the laundry owners. One of 
the owners had been negotiating with Abbey to try to reach a 
settlement, but the other manufacturers convinced him that he 
needed to uphold the principles of the WMA because the strike 
was at a critical point and required the manufacturers to main-
tain a united front.55
 When laundries began reopening with non-union workers, 
it marked the beginning of the end of the strike. By September 
12, work on a reduced scale was proceeding at struck factories, 
including WGE and Iowa Dairy.56  All workers were former em-
ployees who had been required to drop their union member-
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ships and return under pre-strike conditions. There was no in-
terference from pickets, who were reduced in number.57
 
FROM THE BEGINNING, the strikes’ leaders sought arbitra-
tion with the manufacturers, who rejected the process. Labor 
organized a movement to petition Governor W. L. Harding to 
appoint an arbitration board. On August 28 Harding, consider-
ing the welfare of the community to be at stake, ordered arbi-
tration between the strikers and WGE. The company, however, 
refused to participate in, or be bound by, arbitration. The refusal, 
which the newspapers had predicted, came as no surprise.58
 The other struck companies followed WGE’s lead and de-
clined to be part of the arbitration process.59  The manufacturers 
did consider the possibility of participating, but decided that 
“such action would involve them in at least a moral obligation 
to be bound by the conclusions of the Board and would set 
before the public the impression that the manufacturers had 
participated.”60   
 The arbitration committee met on September 16 and heard 
testimony from representatives of the striking WGE workers 
and their attorneys. The strikers made a variety of allegations. 
Witnesses stated that there had been no dissatisfaction at WGE 
until Deere & Company took over and installed the stopwatch 
system. In general, the witnesses claimed that their paychecks 
had been going down while the cost of living was going up.61  
Deere & Company, from the strikers’ point of view, was the 
cause of the problem. 
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 Deere & Company had, in fact, realized early in 1919 that 
the labor situation at WGE was “ripe for some difficulty.” Man-
agement thought that the situation would be corrected by rely-
ing on the individual contract, discontinuing the practice of cut-
ting piece rates, and adding Deere & Company sick benefits, 
insurance, and death and disability benefits. But the company 
had experienced serious quality control problems prior to the 
strike, the plant did not have a good purchasing program, and 
recordkeeping was shoddy, resulting in disrupted production. 
Accumulation of an excessive inventory of tractors forced a re-
duction of the work force from about 1,600 to about 1,100 in 
March. Management had even considered closing the plant 
temporarily in April. Instead, production was cut. The way 
those drastic changes were handled created an environment in 
which “outside organizers” could influence the employees.62
 The arbitration board’s report, completed on September 17, 
reflected some of these problems. It pointed out that the find-
ings might have been different if the company had been willing 
to participate, but the evidence that was presented indicated 
that the company was at fault for the strike. Wages were inade-
quate, the company had broken contracts with workers, and it 
was indifferent to grievances. The issue of a closed shop had 
nothing to do with the strike, in the arbitrators’ opinion. The 
report concluded, “The cause of this strike, from the evidence 
submitted, seems wholly due to grievances that should have 
had sympathetic consideration on the part of the employer.” 
The board urged the factory to reopen, allow workers to “return 
on terms of self-respect,” settle grievances, and establish easier 
“avenues of access to the business office.” The board invited 
management to meet with the workers to discuss the issues.63   
 WGE had known all along, as had everyone else, that the 
board’s decision would not be binding, so there was no reason 
to participate. Although the arbitration board downplayed the 
issues of collective bargaining and closed shops, they were cru-
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cial to the employers. In fact, the most important area of dis-
agreement between labor and management was the question of 
collective bargaining. Management opposed it adamantly. The 
WGE statement released on July 31 clearly rejected it. The laun-
dry owners were willing to make wage concessions, but would 
not accept collective bargaining. Once they were struck, they 
demanded that employees give up union memberships as a 
condition of employment. 
 The question of closed shops versus open shops was even 
more divisive. On August 7 the factories’ position statement pub-
lished in the Courier had claimed that to grant the closed shop 
would be to “sound the death knell” of the plants in six months. 
The Central Labor Union responded on August 19 with its own 
statement: no agreement presented to the manufacturers called 
for a closed shop, but the manufacturers wanted the public to 
think so.64
 The reactions to the arbitration board’s report were predict-
able. The Central Labor Union formally endorsed it while John E. 
Johnson said there was nothing in the report that required a re-
sponse from the company. He also pointed out that the factory 
was running and open to any employee who wanted to return 
to work under prevailing conditions. The WMA decided to 
support the decision to provide no rebuttal.65
 
ONE OF THE NOTEWORTHY THINGS about the strikes 
was the relative lack of violence even though the possibility was 
real and each side had tried to use the threat of it to its advan-
tage. Management, at least at WGE, expected it.66  Incidents took 
place from the beginning. The streetcar brawls of August 16 
caused real excitement as did additional physical encounters on 
August 19. Those events prompted big ads in the Tribune and 
Courier on August 21 and 26 in which the manufacturers claimed 
that the streets were unsafe for workers trying to get to their 
jobs. The violence and intimidation, they claimed, was caused 
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by a few agitators, some from outside the community.67  On 
September 19 the sheriff reported that men carrying suitcases, 
under Abbey’s control, were to arrive the following week to get 
into the plants to blow them up; WGE officials, to their credit, 
did not believe that local labor leaders would use such tactics.68  
In reality, there was not much violence, but the criminal pro-
ceedings that resulted attracted considerable attention and were 
used by the machinists’ union to try to mobilize public support. 
 There were several trials, some relating to alleged violations 
of the injunctions and others the result of arrests for violence. 
The significance to both sides was that the proceedings were of 
great interest to the public. An example was the trial of Clair 
Bloomfield in early September in municipal court. An Iowa 
Dairy Separator Company employee, he was charged with as-
sault and battery on a foreman, who had been driving his car 
pool when attacked by a group of men. Bloomfield was accused 
of jumping on the running board of the car and attempting to 
drag the foreman from the car. Harry Reed, J. E. Jordan, and J. C. 
Murtagh, attorneys provided by the machinists’ union, repre-
sented Bloomfield; Abbey, acting in an advisory capacity, was 
seated with the lawyers. Evidently Murtagh’s speech to the jury 
was a fiery one, containing his opinions about organized labor 
and the strike situation, because when he finished, the specta-
tors, mostly strikers, “broke into cheers, hand clapping, shrill 
whistles and cat calls, while the more excitable stamped their 
feet and threw their hats in the air.” The case was turned over to 
the jury at 4:30 p.m., and the guilty verdict was returned at 7:05. 
When court reconvened the next day, Bloomfield was sentenced 
to the maximum: $100 and costs or 30 days in jail.69  He did not, 
by its make-up, have an unsympathetic jury; the testimony made 
it clear that he was guilty. The strike leaders used the trial as an 
opportunity for Murtagh to speak stirringly about the strike, 
and the trial was covered extensively in the newspapers. 
 Some of the same individuals were involved in legal pro-
ceedings resulting from violations of the injunctions that the 
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manufacturers had secured. Three had been arrested for con-
tempt of court as well as for assault after the August 16 streetcar 
incidents. The trials provided Murtagh and the union’s other 
lawyers another forum to speak for labor’s cause; they did not 
bother to dispute the fact that the injunction had been violated. 
The proceedings against these men began in mid-August and 
finally concluded at the end of September, when they pled guilty 
to contempt. An attorney representing WGE demanded a jail 
term for the offenders. When the judge imposed a $50 fine as 
sentence, another attorney for the company demanded that the 
offenders go to jail until their fines were paid. F. H. Mulholland, 
a Toledo, Ohio, attorney, provided by the IAM, convinced the 
judge, however, to allow the men some time to raise the money, 
since, he pointed out, “As a rule men who have been on strike 
for over eight weeks do not carry $50 about in their pockets.”70   
 It was October before the legal wrangling over the various 
assault, illegal assembly, and injunction violation charges ended. 
It was clear from the testimony that the strike really had been 
quite peaceful. It was also obvious that the newspaper coverage 
had kept the community well informed about what was going 
on in the courtrooms. 
 
WORKERS began returning to work in increasing numbers after 
September 19 at all of the plants while others continued to try to 
reach a settlement with the employers. The WMA kept pressur-
ing members to hold firm, pointing out that the workers who 
had remained loyal and on the job considered it unfair to nego-
tiate with the strikers. The group also insisted that none of the 
returning workers be union members, and all were required 
to sign individual contracts. Although the WMA considered 
bringing in strikebreakers at that juncture, reports that they 
were receiving indicated that the strikers considered their cause 
lost and were ready to return to work on any terms.71
 By late September, things were dismal for the strikers. The 
machinists’ union advised them that there were no more funds 
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Waterloo office force, undated. Seated, left to right: L. A. Paradise, Lou B. 
Witry, J. E. Johnson, Allen Head. Paradise was named superintendent of 
the John Deere Tractor Company in 1918. Courtesy of John Deere. 
available for use in the court battles that were taking place. F. H. 
Mulholland, the IAM’s attorney, reportedly said that the strike 
was lost and that he was leaving town. Foundries at Bovee 
Grinder and Furnace Works, Headford Foundry, Interstate 
Foundry, and WGE were all running on a limited basis. The 
WMA continued efforts to get employees, especially teamsters, 
to sign individual contracts.72
 Once it became clear that the strike was ending, Deere & 
Company, unhappy with the leadership provided by John 
Johnson and Lou Witry, announced management changes at 
WGE. Allen Head replaced Johnson as general manager on Oc-
tober 1, and Witry was relieved of his duties as manager of fac-
tory operations.73
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 By mid-October workers were returning to all of the plants 
as fast as they could be handled; union leaders reportedly were 
encouraging them to do so. Pickets appeared to be on duty only 
to qualify for strike benefits. The coal and ice companies were 
successful in forcing individual contracts on their teamsters. By 
October 20, when Abbey left to get some rest, the manufacturers 
were satisfied that the strike was over. They did not think Ab-
bey would return. Pickets were almost completely absent by 
October 27; only a very few of the “radicals and old-timers” at-
tended the morning strikers’ meetings. WGE readjusted wage 
rates upward on November 3; by then, management had met 
individually with all employees.74
 By mid-November, the strikes were over and the reorganiza-
tion of the WMA into the Waterloo Industrial Association was 
complete. Membership was open to any industrial or com-
mercial business employing five or more people. Mayor R. C. 
Thompson resigned in mid-November in the wake of a furor 
involving women and a party. He was replaced by T. E. Leeper, 
an alderman who, from management’s point of view, could “be 
depended upon to enforce the laws in a forcible and fair man-
ner.” The Central Labor Union sent a letter to other labor or-
ganizations in the state instructing them to cease mail contri-
butions to the strike fund. By mid-December, all plants were 
operating with full work forces. Organized labor was beaten.75
 
THE WATERLOO STRIKES of 1919 failed for several reasons. 
First, the strike fund was insufficient. Several non-striking unions 
made pledges: Illinois Central Railroad workers, Rath Packing 
Company employees, printers, barbers, city firemen, and team-
sters. Money was also pledged from other sources: the Salvation 
Army, the Cedar Rapids Federation of Labor, and labor organi-
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zations in Oelwein. But pledges were not always met. By mid-
September, the strike fund was low, with demands for benefits 
exceeding revenues, and by the end of the month it was empty. 
By October, Local 314 and the Central Labor Union had split as 
the Central determined that the machinists’ strike was lost. Lo-
cal 314 remained officially on strike into the spring of 1920, with 
about 30 “old men” refusing to return, but the local was in debt 
and defeated.76
 The inability of Local 314 to mobilize a broader spectrum of 
Waterloo’s workers also helps explain why the strike failed. The 
machinists instigated the strikes, but in order to succeed they 
needed the total support of the Waterloo Central Labor Union. 
That support was lukewarm at best. When the Central Labor 
Union, and then the Iowa State Federation of Labor, withdrew 
all financial support, the machinists were left standing alone, 
and their strike failed. The only glimmer of hope came when 
the laundry workers went on strike. Leon Clausen correctly be-
lieved that they went on strike as part of the attempt to institute 
a general strike.77
 One of the striking machinists’ objectives, and ultimately 
their only real hope for victory, was to organize a general strike. 
On July 31 C. H. Milnes, business agent for Local 314, predicted 
that there would be “a general sympathetic strike affecting 
every concern in the city employing union labor,” and Abbey 
thought Waterloo was “ripe” for a general strike. The success 
of a general strike depended on the support of the Central 
Labor Union. But on July 31 its president, T. N. Stufflebeam, 
doubted “that at this time a general strike would hasten the 
conciliation.” By August 7 it was clear that the Central Labor 
Union would not call a general strike. According to Stuffle-
beam, “Should a general strike be called and the strikers fail to 
win, Waterloo would suffer the consequences. Every union man 
in the city probably would move where labor conditions are 
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more equitable. And the town would be flooded with foreign-
ers and hoodlums.”78
 The success of a general strike in Waterloo depended in 
large part on what the 1,200 workers at Illinois Central Railroad 
would do. But rail workers nationwide were involved in a labor 
dispute involving the federal government, and they needed the 
approval of their international union to strike, so they did not 
join the Waterloo strike. In August there had been unsuccessful 
attempts to organize retail store clerks, cooks and waiters, bakers 
and confectioners, and “servant girls.” Members of the local 
Typographical Union were not willing to strike. Auto mechanics 
had no interest in organizing or striking since they already 
had better conditions and wages than those demanded by the 
unions. The same was true of Rath Packing Company employ-
ees. A strike by motion picture machine operators was averted 
when owners of the six theaters agreed to increase wages. When 
teamsters went on strike in mid-September, they were immedi-
ately fired; thereafter all teamsters were required to sign indi-
vidual contracts.79
 By August 29 Stufflebeam reportedly was ready to work 
to end the strike. He claimed that the Central Labor Union had 
opposed the strike from the start, blaming it on Abbey and the 
machinists’ local. On September 17 a resolution advocating a 
general strike came up again at a Central Labor Union meeting 
but was voted down almost unanimously. The Central Labor 
Union’s failure to endorse a general strike hurt the machinists’ 
cause: they had to stand alone against the city’s powerful 
employers.80
 While labor in Waterloo was unable to present a united front, 
the employers did, thanks largely to the leadership of Deere & 
Company’s WGE. After the workers struck on July 31, the com-
pany released a statement printed in the newspapers that re-
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mained the foundation of the employers’ position.81  It clearly 
rejected collective bargaining and emphasized the “constitu-
tional” rights of workers and management to negotiate indi-
vidual contracts. On August 4 Leon Clausen explained to John 
Johnson how Deere & Company wanted the strike situation 
handled. All efforts to ensure law and order should be sup-
ported aggressively, but otherwise the company should adopt 
a passive stance. The shops were to be kept open with those 
people who were willing to work; should no one report to work 
the doors would be locked and watchmen hired. No replace-
ment workers were to be hired. The statement issued on July 31 
was to remain the official, and only, position. The employers’ 
business policies were not subject to arbitration by any third 
party. “We will stand for our rights as employers and citizens 
regardless of the length of time it takes to establish those rights 
—whether it is one month, six months, one year or five years, 
and it will do no harm to have everybody in Waterloo under-
stand this.”82
 Prior to the strike, WGE employees had been required to 
sign a contract. It defined what the company would do: pay a 
specified hourly wage or a price for piece work (and not reduce 
them during the life of the contract), furnish employment as 
steadily as conditions permitted, comply with principles and 
rules as posted in the shops, pay one-quarter of the cost of the 
Sick Benefit Fund, and pay compensation for any work-related 
injuries according to Iowa law. The employee, in turn, was ex-
pected to “faithfully serve” the company during the period of 
the contract (unless prevented by illness or quitting), not join 
any “concerted action” to change hours, wages, or working 
conditions, preserve and care for company property, comply 
with principles and rules as posted in the shops, and accept 
compensation for any work-related injuries according to Iowa 
law.83
 Once WGE employees went on strike, Deere & Company 
began considering changes to the contract. By the time workers 
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WGE employee picnic, ca. 1920. Courtesy of John Deere. 
began returning, it had the wording perfected. There were sig-
nificant changes. The company agreed that it would pay all 
costs for employees under the Deere & Company Death, Dis-
ability and Pension Fund (in addition to the one-quarter of the 
Sick Benefit costs). The employee’s commitments remained the 
same except for a major addition: “That he is not now and will 
not become a member of a labor union or similar organization 
while in the employ of the Company.”84
 The unbending opposition of the manufacturers, led by 
Deere & Company, to collective bargaining was the ultimate 
cause of the failure of the strikes in Waterloo in the fall of 1919. 
There was no record of success in long strikes in Waterloo, and 
there was no union tradition of enduring short-term personal 
hardships in return for long-term gains. As long as the strike 
fund provided a livelihood, the strikers stayed off their jobs. 
Organized labor had a problem that the IAM and the manufac-
turers no doubt, recognized: if strikers did not succeed in reach-
ing their goals within about four weeks, they had a tendency 
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to give up.85  Had the strikes’ organizers been able to generate 
enough support to organize a general strike, they might have 
been able to break the united front presented by management. 
 As a result of the strike, employers realized that they needed 
to deal fairly with workplace complaints to prevent future de-
mands for collective bargaining. Deere & Company saw that 
some managers were unwilling or unable to adapt, so they were 
replaced. The company formalized its industrial relations poli-
cies and procedures in 1920 based on two cornerstones: em-
ployees must be treated well, and the open shop had to be 
maintained.86
 A major depression devastated the farm equipment indus-
try shortly after the strikes ended in Waterloo. Deere & Com-
pany and its factory at Waterloo survived, and later thrived, 
continuing to fight against collective bargaining. Not until 1942, 
when Deere & Company’s Waterloo employees chose the 
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implements 
Workers (CIO) to represent them (with the first collective bar-
gaining contract signed in 1943), did a new era of industrial re-
lations begin in Waterloo.87  By then the struggle of 1919 had 
been long forgotten. 
 
                                                 
85. Machinists Monthly Journal, August 1919, 729.  
86. See Deere & Company Factory Managers Meeting, 10/11–13/1920, DA 
#37741. 
87. Moline Dispatch, 3/26/1943; Courier, 4/17/1967. 
